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1.  Introduction 
Competition can be economic or political in nature.  Economics tends to focus on the 
economic competition, while political science tends to focus on the political competition.  
Either focus alone may be incomplete, if not misleading.      
Policy-makers are selected by voters via political competition between citizen 
candidates.  This form of representative democracy is prevalent in the real world.  Osborne 
and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) emphasize the importance of this political 
competition, since citizen candidates who possess different policy preferences will implement 
different policies once selected to become policy-makers.  In this paper we incorporate the 
stylized form of political competition into the stylized model of tax competition.  Our focus is 
on the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional 
political competition for the optimal provision of public goods.  This focus echoes Frey and 
Eichenberger’s (1996) emphasis that both economic and political distortions should be 
considered in the analysis of tax competition.               
A fundamental result in the literature on tax competition is that interregional tax 
competition for mobile capital generates fiscal externalities and tends to result in an 
undersupply of public goods in a region.  This result is originally articulated by Oates (1972) 
and formally modeled by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).
1   In an 
important contribution, Hoyt (1991) shows that the extent to which public goods are 
undersupplied is monotonically increasing in the number of competing regions.  In contrast to 
this monotonic finding, we show that the relationship between the level of public good supply 
and the number of competing regions is non-monotonic if political as well as tax competition 
is considered.  Interestingly, some certain interaction between interregional tax competition 
and intraregional political competition can result in the optimal provision of public goods. 
On the basis of his finding, Hoyt (1991, p. 130) concludes:  
                                                       
1 See Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Fuest et al. (2005) for surveys of the literature. 2 
The existence of wasteful tax competition suggests that the optimal number of jurisdictions is one, thereby 
eliminating the externalities created by capital taxation.  The traditional Tiebout literature argues that having 
many independent jurisdictions promotes efficiency and taste stratification by increasing the competition 
among jurisdictions.  Thus, a tradeoff is faced, more jurisdictions increase the sorting of residents but at a cost 
of decreasing the public service provision because of tax competition. 
The tradeoff suggested may not exist once political as well as tax competition is considered.    
The literature on tax competition for mobile factors largely leaves out the stylized form 
of political competition as emphasized in this paper.
2   Persson and Tabellini (1992) is a 
notable exception, but their focus is not on the provision of public goods.  In the presence of 
tax competition, Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (1998) consider Leviathan models 
while Wilson (2005) considers a self-interested-government-official model.  These papers 
take into account some elements of politics within a region, but they do not touch on the 
selection of policy-makers in a representative democracy.   
There are two studies that are most related to our paper.  Brueckner (2001) considers a 
model in which both tax and political competition are present, and individuals are 
heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of public goods.  He shows that, due to the 
voters’ strategic delegation, capital tax rates under tax coordination may be lower than those 
under tax competition.  Fuest and Huber (2001) compare tax competition with tax 
coordination in a median-voter model.  They find that there may be an overprovision of public 
goods under tax competition and that tax coordination need not be welfare-improving.   
Although all consider tax and political competition in a framework, there are two main 
differences in modeling between our paper and these two papers.  First, the number of 
competing regions is fixed at two (a two-country model) in Brueckner (2001), and at infinity 
(a small-country model) in Fuest and Huber (2001).  As a result, the degree of tax competition 
(i.e., variations in the number of regions) plays no role in both papers.  By contrast, the degree 
                                                       
2 For surveys of political economy approaches to tax competition, see Wilson (1999) and Fuest et al. (2005). 3 
of tax competition is the key focus of our paper.  Secondly, individual heterogeneity is with 
respect to the valuation of public goods in Brueckner (2001), and with respect to the effective 
time endowment in Fuest and Huber (2001).  By contrast, individual heterogeneity is with 
respect to the capital ownership in our paper.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents our model.  
Section 3 exposes the connection between political competition and tax policy, and Section 4 
explores the implications of tax-cum-political competition.  Section 5 concludes. 
   
2.  Economy with tax competition 
Our model of the economy is standard in the tax competition literature,
3 except for the 
extension from homogeneous to heterogeneous individuals.     
Consider an economy in which there are n identical regions, where  } ,..., 1 { ∞ ∈ n .  Each 
region is inhabited by N individuals.  There are two factors of production: an interregional 
immobile factor and a perfectly mobile factor.  We will refer to the former as “land” and to the 
latter as “capital.”
4  Each individual in each region has the same claim to land, but unequal 
claims to capital.  Specifically, individual j in region i supplies  N / 1 ≡ θ  units of land and  ij k  
units of capital.   
Let  ∑ =
j
ij i k k .  Denoting the amount of capital employed in region i by  i k , capital 





i k k .                                                          (1) 
All regions produce a single private good whose price is normalized to unity.  This private 
good can either be consumed directly as a private commodity, c, or be used to provide the 
                                                       
3 The model is built on Hoyt (1991).  As noted by Hoyt, his model follows that of Wildasin (1988).  It is a 
textbook, workhorse model of tax competition; see, for example, Wellisch (2000, Section 4.1) and Haufler (2001, 
Section 4.3). 
4 “Capital” can be human as well as physical capital. 4 
regional public service, g.
5  One unit of the private good produces one unit of the public 
service.  The production in each region is given by  ) ( i k f  with  0 ) ( > ′ i k f  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ i k f , 
where a unit of the land input in the region is suppressed.  All markets are assumed to be 
perfectly competitive. 
Each region levies a source tax at rate  i t  on each unit of capital employed within its 
region.  Perfectly mobile capital implies 
) ,..., ( ) ( 1 n i i t t r t k f = − ′  ∀ i                                                         (2) 
where r  is the after-tax rate of return on capital, which depends on  n t t ,..., 1 and is equalized 
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where  i −  denotes any region other than region i. 
Let  ) , ( i ij ij g c u u ≡  denote the preferences of individual j in region i over the private 
good  c and the public service g.  We shall work with the quasi-linear form: 
) ( ) , ( i ij i ij g v c g c u + =  with  0 > ′ v ,  0 < ′ ′ v , and  −∞ →
→ ) ( lim
0 i g g v
i
.  For one thing, this form 
has become standard in the literature on public goods.
7  Perhaps more importantly, the quasi-
linear form makes our work directly comparable with a large tax competition literature on the 
efficiency problems associated with the provision of public goods.  It is known that the 
criterion of Pareto efficiency (i.e., the so-called Samuelson condition) alone is unable to 
                                                       
5 The public service may be interpreted as either a publicly provided private good shared equally by all residents 
or a Samuelson public good consumed jointly by all residents, and there are no spillover effects across regions 
(see Wilson 1986 and Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). 
6 See Hoyt (1991). 
7 See, for example, Besley and Coate (2003) and Batina and Ihori (2005). 5 
uniquely determine the optimal level of public goods in general when individuals are 
heterogeneous.
8  A social welfare function is typically introduced to pin it down in such 
situations.  However, this approach may be arbitrary in our context since different social 
welfare functions as a rule point to different optimal levels of public goods.  The advantage of 
the quasi-linear form is that it enables us to stick to the criterion of Pareto efficiency and, at 
the same time, uniquely determine the optimal level of public goods even in the case of 
heterogeneous people. 
The government budget constraint in each region implies  
i i i k t g =  ∀ i.                                                          (4) 
On the other hand, the individual budget constraint implies 
ij i i i ij k r k t r k f c + + − = ] ) ( ) ( [ θ  ∀ ij                                                          (5) 
where  i i i k t r k f ) ( ) ( + −  is the rent per unit of land in region i.  By assumption, individual j in 
region i supplies θ  units of land and  ij k  units of capital. 
 
3.  Political competition and tax policy 
This section analyzes the endogenous formation of the capital tax rate within each 
region. 
We apply the citizen-candidate model proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and 
Besley and Coate (1997).  More specifically, we consider a two-stage game as in Besley and 
Coate (2003).  First, elections in each region determine which individual is selected to govern 
the region.  Second, tax policies are chosen simultaneously by the elected individuals in the 
economy.  Following Osborne and Slivinski (1996), the political process of selecting a policy- 
maker is viewed as the “political competition” in our model.      
We solve the game backward. 
                                                       
8 See Varian (1992, p. 419) 6 
 
3.1. Second stage: tax competition 
Let the elected individual in region i own  ij k  units of capital.  Given  n i i t t t t ... , ,..., , 1 1 1 + − , 
the chosen tax policy  i t  satisfies 
)} ( { max arg ) ( i ij t ij i g v c k t
i
+ =   ∀ i 
where  i g  and  ij c  follow (4) and (5), respectively.  The first-order conditions for the above 
program are given by 























 ∀ i                                                  (6) 
where  ) ( i g v′  is the marginal benefit of the public service.  It is assumed that  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i ij t u  
so that the second-order conditions are met and there is a unique  ) ( ij i k t  satisfying (6).
9   
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= ′  ∀ i                                                  (7) 
where  i ij ij k k s / ≡  (the share of capital owned by individual j in region i),  ) /( i i i t r t + ≡ τ (the 
ad valorem tax rate in region i), and  ] / ) )][( ( / [ i i i i i k t r t r k + + ∂ ∂ − ≡ ε  (the  elasticity  of 
demand for capital with respect to the before-tax rate of return in region i).  The left-hand side 
(LHS) of (7) denotes the marginal benefit of raising  i g , while the right-hand side (RHS) 
refers to the corresponding marginal cost.  The term (1/ ) ij ns corresponds to the marginal cost 
of a decrease in the after-tax rate of capital return r due to an increase in  i t , while the term 
                                                       
9  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i ij t u   is equivalent to  0 ) / )( ( ) / )( ( ) / ))( / 1 ( 1 (
2 2 2 < ∂ ∂ ′ ′ + ∂ ∂ ′ + ∂ ∂ − − i i i i i i i i t g g v t g g v t k n θ .  A 
sufficient condition to uphold the inequality is that: (i)  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i i t g , which is a standard assumption imposed 
on the Laffer curve, and (ii) N is large so that  N / 1 = θ  is small.  7 
[1 (1/ )] n θ −  corresponds to the marginal cost of a decrease in the rent due to an increase in  i t .  
As to the denominator of (7), it captures the marginal cost associated with a tax induced 
outflow of capital.  
 
Special cases   
Condition (7) gives rise to several special cases: 
(i)  θ = ij s   
This represents the case where individuals have the same claim to capital in each region.  








= ′ ⋅  ∀ i                                              (7-1) 
which is the standard public-good-provision condition in the presence of tax competition 
when individuals are homogeneous (see, for example, Wilson and Wildasin, 2004, Eq. (1)). 
 
(ii)  ∞ → n  
This implies that  0 / → ∂ ∂ i t r  from (3).  Thus, it represents the “price-taker” or “small 
region” case where the after-tax rate of return on capital is beyond the control of individual 
regions.  Then (7) reduces to 
  
i i





) (  ∀ i                                              (7-2) 
which corresponds to the result derived in the seminal work of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986).  It is interesting to observe that this result holds regardless of 
whether individuals are homogeneous or heterogeneous.  That is, both (7) and (7-1) will 
reduce to (7-2) whenever  ∞ → n .  As  ∞ → n , an increase in  i t  does not change r at all (see 
Eq. (3-1)), and hence the effect on capital income  ij rk  does not arise.  It then follows that the 
initial distribution of capital holding does not matter for the determination of the tax rate and 
the level of public goods. 8 
 
(iii)  1 = n  
Since there is only one region in the economy, this represents the case where there is no 
tax competition or the economy is closed.  Then (7) reduces to 
ij i s g v = ′ ) (  ∀ i                                             (7-3) 
where the elected individual j in region i will choose the public good level that equates the 
marginal benefit of the public service with his or her share of capital.  This result is not 
surprising since, by the government budget constraint (4), an individual’s share of capital 
determines his or her share of the tax burden in a region in which there is no tax competition 
(i.e. no mobile tax base). 
 
(iv)  θ = ij s  and  1 = n  
This is the case where individuals are homogeneous and the economy is closed.  Then 
(7) reduces to 
1 ) ( = ′ ⋅ i g v N  ∀ i                                              (7-4) 
which is the Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of public goods. Eq. (7-4) 
uniquely determines the first-best level of public goods, 
F g .    
 
Comparison 
Let us compare standard homogeneous-individual models with our heterogeneous-
individual model. 
 
(i) Homogeneity ( θ = ij s ) 
 When  N sij / 1 = =θ , (7) will reduce to (7-1), which will further be reduced to (7-4) if 
and only if  1 = n ; that is, when individuals are homogeneous, the level of public goods in a 9 
region will be optimally supplied if and only if tax competition is absent.
10   This is the 
benchmark case considered by most of the tax competition literature.  Comparing (7-1) with 
(7-4) leads to the fundamental result in the literature: tax competition ( ) 1 > n  results in an 
undersupply of public goods, relative to the benchmark case where tax competition is absent 
( ) 1 = n .
11   
 
(ii) Heterogeneity ( θ ≠ ij s )  
However, the above fundamental result need not hold in general when there are 
heterogeneous individuals.  First, observe from (7-3) that the level of public goods in the 
absence of tax competition will be oversupplied rather than undersupplied if  N sij / 1 ≡ <θ , 
that is, if the elected individual in a region owns a share of capital smaller than the average 
share in the region.  This suggests that tax competition ( ) 1 > n  may have desirable effects to 
“correct” the oversupply of public goods in a closed economy ( ) 1 = n  in the presence of 
political competition.  In the scenario where individuals are homogeneous, we must have 
1/ ij s N =  and there is no political competition by definition.  On the contrary, in the scenario 
where individuals are heterogeneous, we may well have the case of  N sij / 1 < , so that the 
consequence of political competition will become important. 
Next, when  ∞ → n , (7-2) indicates that the level of public goods will be undersupplied, 
relative to the first-best condition (7-4).  By contrast, when  1 = n , (7-3) indicates that the level 
of public goods will be oversupplied, relative to the first-best condition (7-4), if  N sij / 1 < .  
Putting together the undersupply if  ∞ → n   and the oversupply if  1 = n  suggests  the 
                                                       
10 By our assumptions imposed on  (.) v , 0 > i τ  must hold since  0 = i τ  implies that  0 = i g .  It can be seen from 
(2) that  f t r k i i ′ ′ = + ∂ ∂ / 1 ) ( /  and so  0 > i ε  must hold as well.  
11 This fundamental result is stated as Proposition 4.1 in Wellisch (2000, p. 64) and as Proposition 4.2 in Haufler 
(2001, p. 65).  10 
possibility that there exists an optimal intensity of interregional tax competition, that is, there 
is an 
* n n =  with  ∞ < <
* 1 n   under which public goods in a region will be optimally 
supplied.   
To sum up, in our heterogeneous-individual model with political competition, tax 
competition may exert desirable effects on the provision of public goods and, perhaps more 
interestingly, there may exist an intensity of tax competition to support the optimal level of 
public goods.  We explore both possibilities in Section 4. 
 
3.2. First stage: political competition 
In this stage, individuals in each region select a policy-maker via election.  There are two 
questions that need be answered.  First, who is the decisive voter in selecting a policy-maker?  
Second, will the decisive voter select him- or herself as the policy-maker or strategically 
delegate the policy-making to other individuals?  We address these two questions in turn. 
 
Decisive voter 
From the first-order conditions (6), we have 
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1 ( − − − =
∂
∂
θ  ∀ i.                          (9) 
Suppose the tax rate is raised.  Then, the first RHS term of (9) represents the corresponding 
change in the labor income (the same negative effect across heterogeneous individuals), while 
the second RHS term of (9) represents the corresponding change in the capital income (varied 
negative effects across heterogeneous individuals).  Both terms are negative. 
Since  ) / 1 ( / ) / ( n k t c ij i ij − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  by (9), Eq. (8) leads to 11 
0
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 ∀ i                                                (10) 
which implies that the lower the share of capital owned by an individual, the higher is the tax 
rate preferred by the individual.  This result is intuitive because redistribution from the rich to 
the poor can take place through sharing the cost of the public good provision differently.  
Nevertheless, the redistributive incentives of the poor are qualified in the presence of tax 
competition since the RHS of (10) depends on the number of competing regions n as well.  In 
particular, observe that the rich and the poor will concur with each other on the tax policy 
when  ∞ → n .  This is so because, from (9), a change in the tax rate will not affect the after-
tax rate of return on capital but will only affect the common labor income once  ∞ → n .   
By the assumption that  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i ij t u , the preferences of individuals qua voters exhibit 
single-peakedness over tax rates  i t .  Since  ) ( ij i k t  is monotonic in  ij k according to (10), the 
individual preferences for  i t  induce a preference ordering for  ij k .  This induced preference 
obviously exhibits single-peakedness over capital endowments  ij k .  Then, invoking the 
median voter theorem, we arrive at:  
 
Lemma 1. The lower the share of capital owned by an individual, the higher is the tax rate 
preferred by the individual. The decisive voter in political competition is the median voter, 
that is, the individual who owns a median share of  i k , denoted by 
m
ij s . 
This has a conventional flavor since it agrees with two standard results of political 
competition: (i) the median voter is a decisive voter in selecting the policy-maker, and (ii) the 
median voter’s income relative to average income is critical in the determination of the size of 
the public sector as developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
12 
                                                       
12 Fuest and Huber (2001) obtain a similar result with respect to labor income taxation in a tax competition model.  12 
 
Strategic delegation  
Persson and Tabellini (1992) point out that a decisive voter may not wish to elect him- or 
herself as the policymaker.
13  The reason behind this result is that policy-makers evaluate 
policy ex post (after elections), whereas voters evaluate policy ex ante (before/during 
elections).  In terms of our model, this implies that while the policy-maker in region i takes  i t−  
as given in the second stage of the game (policy-makers move simultaneously in choosing 
their tax policies according to (6)), voters in region i take the reaction of  i t−  to   i t  as given in 
the first stage of the game (in choosing a policy-maker, voters realize that tax policies will be 

























 ∀ i                                                (11) 
where  ij u  is  evaluated  at 
m
ij s , the median share of  i k .  It is assumed that 




i i i ij i ij t t t t u t u Δ  so that the second-order conditions are met 
and there is a unique  ) (
m
ij i s t  satisfying (11).   
Using (3) gives  



















θ  ∀ i,  i −                                                (12) 
where we have utilized the property that  i i k k =  in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.  Since 
positively skewed distributions of capital income are typically observed in the real world, we 
                                                       
13 See also Brueckner (2001), who shows that, to offset the tax decreasing (increasing) effect of competition 
(coordination), the decisive voter has an incentive to elect a policy-maker who has high (low) valuation of public 
goods.  It should be pointed out that the strategic delegation is an interesting rather than essential part of our 
model.  Our main results remain true even if representative democracy (policy is indirectly determined by the 
decisive voter via the selection of a policy-maker) is replaced by direct democracy (policy is directly determined 
by the decisive voter).        13 
shall impose the inequality  N s
m
ij / 1 = <θ .  This then implies from (12) that  0 / > ∂ ∂ −i ij t u  
when it is evaluated at 
m
ij s .   
As long as  0 / > ∂ ∂ − i i t t , which is reasonable in the context of tax competition and 
particularly true in our symmetric model, (11) and the positive sign of (12) together yield: 
0 / < ∂ ∂ i ij t u   when it is evaluated at 
m
ij s .  Appealing to (10),  0 / < ∂ ∂ i ij t u  at 
m
ij s  plus 
0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i ij t u then implies: 
 
Lemma 2. The decisive median voter in each region will select a policy-maker whose capital 
share is lower than 
m
ij s  if  1 > n , but will select him- or herself as the policy-maker if  1 = n . 
That is to say, when  1 > n , the decisive voter will not select him- or herself as the policy- 
maker but will strategically delegate the policy-making to other individuals whose capital 
share is lower than his or her own share 
m
ij s .  The intuition is as follows.  The tax rate 
preferred by the decisive voter satisfies (11), which is the optimal condition ex ante 
(before/during elections).  By contrast, the tax rate preferred by the policy-maker satisfies (6), 
which is the optimal condition ex post (after elections).  The optimal ex ante tax rate is higher 
than the optimal ex post tax rate, since  0 / < ∂ ∂ i ij t u   at the ex ante optimum whereas 
0 / = ∂ ∂ i ij t u  at the ex post optimum.  To implement the higher optimal ex ante tax rate, the 
selected policy-maker must have a lower capital share than the median voter (see Eq. (10)).  
This outcome results simply because the decisive voter takes the reaction of  i t−  to   i t  as 
given, while the policy-maker takes  i t−  as given.  Anticipating an increase in  i t  will induce an 
increase in  i t− , the decisive voter is better off via delegating the policy-making to an 
individual with a capital share lower than his or her own. 14 
When 1 = n , (11) will collapse to (6) since  i −  does not exist.  In such a case, it is 
obvious that the decisive voter will select him- or herself as the policy-maker and there is no 
strategic delegation.  
The decisive voter takes the reaction of  i t−  to   i t  as given.  From (11), we then have 
0 ]




























dt Δ  ∀ i.                                              (13) 
Since  ) / 1 ( / ) / ( / ) / ( n k t c k t c ij i ij ij i ij − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − , (13) leads to 
0
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ij k s k ⋅ = .  Let 
p
ij s  denote the share of capital owned by the policy-maker, who is 
selected by the decisive median voter with 
m
ij ij s s = .  Putting (10) and (14) together yields: 
 
Lemma 3. The lower the 
m
ij s , the lower is the 
P
ij s . 
In words, the lower the share of capital owned by a decisive voter, the higher is the tax 
rate preferred by the decisive voter (see Eq. (14)); as a result, the decisive voter will select a 
policy-maker who has a lower share of capital to implement the decisive voter’s preferred tax 
rate (see Eq. (10)). 
 
4.  Implications of tax-cum-political competition 
This section explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax 
competition and intraregional political competition for the provision of public goods. 
 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 15 
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Note that  ) )( / 1 ( / ) / (
2
i ij i ij k k n n t c θ − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ and that  ) / )( / 1 ( / ) / (
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 ∀ i                                                            (16)           
where we utilize  i i k k =   in a symmetric Nash equilibrium.  This result implies that 
0 ) / ) ( ( < ∂ ∂ n k t ij i  if  i ij k k θ < ; that is, the equilibrium tax rate chosen by the policy-maker is 
monotonically decreasing in the number of competing regions if  N sij / 1 < .  From Lemma 2, 
the decisive median voter selects a policy-maker who owns a capital share 
P
ij s  equal to or 
lower than the median share 
m
ij s , which is lower than the mean share  N / 1 .  Thus, we have: 
 
Lemma 4.  0 ) / ) ( ( < ∂ ∂ n k t ij i  holds in equilibrium in our economy. 
Eq. (9) gives  0 ] ) / 1 ( )) / 1 ( 1 ( [ ) / ( < + − − = ∂ ∂ ij i i ij s n n k t c θ  in equilibrium.  Thus, from 
(6), we also have: 
 
Lemma 5. 0 ) / ( > ∂ ∂ i i t g  holds in equilibrium in our economy. 
With Lemmas 1-5 at hand, we now turn to the two possibilities mentioned in Section 3: 
the desirable effects of tax competition and the optimal intensity of tax competition.  For ease 
of exposition in the following, we employ the terms “increased” interregional tax competition 
and “increased” intraregional political competition.  We first explain what they mean. 
                                                       
14 We treat n as a continuous variable as in Seade (1980).  16 
The term “increased interregional tax competition” simply means an increase in the 
number of competing regions n.  This follows Wilson and Widasin (2004). 
Following Meltzer and Richard (1981), we view the deviation between 
m
ij s  (the median 
share of capital) and  N / 1  (the mean share of capital) as a metaphor for income inequality in a 
region.  The larger the deviation between 
m
ij s  and  N / 1 , the higher is the degree of income 
inequality in the region.  Given  N / 1 , we interpret a decrease in 
m
ij s  (a deterioration in income 
inequality) as “increased” intraregional political competition, in the sense that the interest 
conflict between the mean and the median voter increases.    
 
4.2. Optimal interregional tax competition 
When there is no tax competition or the economy is closed (i.e.,  1 = n ), we have in 
equilibrium 
m
ij i s g v = ′ ) (  ∀ i                                           (7-3*) 
where we have utilized Lemmas 1-2.  Eq. (7-3*) implies that  1 ) ( < ′ ⋅ i g v N  in equilibrium 
since  ) / 1 ( N s
m
ij < . 
When  ∞ → n , (7-2) indicates that the level of public goods in a region will be 
undersupplied, relative to the first-best condition (7-4).  This outcome results because the 
force of tax competition completely dominates when  ∞ → n .  By contrast, when  1 = n , (7-
3*) indicates that the level of public goods in a region will be oversupplied, relative to the 
first-best condition (7-4).  This outcome results because the force of political competition 
completely dominates when  1 = n .  Putting them together and appealing to Lemmas 4-5, one 
would conjecture that there exists an 
* n n =  with  ∞ < <
* 1 n  under which public goods in a 
region will be optimally supplied.  This conjecture is verified below.  17 
Replacing  ij s  with 
P
ij s  in Eq. (7) and solving for n that satisfies the first-best condition 










*  ∀ i.                                                 (17) 
This resulting 
* n  will be greater than 1 but smaller than infinity if the inequality  N s
P
ij / 1 <  
holds.




ij / 1 < ≤  in equilibrium. 
To sum up, we obtain 
 
Proposition 1-T (Tax competition). Given  ) / 1 ( N s
m
ij <  (intraregional political competition), 
there is an  ) (
* m
ij s n n =  (the optimal interregional tax competition) with  ∞ < < ) ( 1
* m
ij s n  under 
which public goods will be optimally supplied (
F
i gg = ). 
Mathematically,  1 = n  must hold if one wants to reduce (7-1) to (7-4).  In other words, to 
achieve the first-best provision of public goods in an economy with homogeneous individuals, 
there must be no tax competition.  This leads to the fundamental result in the literature that tax 
competition ( 1 > n ) will result in an undersupply of public goods (relative to the first-best in a 
closed economy).  By contrast, we have shown that it is possible to reduce (7) to (7-4) with 
1 > n  in our heterogeneous-individual economy when political competition is present.   
Proposition 1 immediately leads to: 
 
                                                       
15 The case where  0 → i iε τ  is ruled out by default, otherwise (7-1) would reach the first-best regardless of n. 18 
Corollary 1-T. Given  ) / 1 ( N s
m
ij < , increased interregional tax competition (an increase in n) 
will “correct” the oversupply of public goods caused by intraregional political competition if 
) (
* m
ij s n n < .  




ij ds ds , that is, 
P
ij s is a strictly increasing function of 
m
ij s .  Thus, (17) gives the following characterization for  ) (
* m
ij s n . 
 
Proposition 2-T.  Other things being equal (i.e., N and  i iε τ  are given), the lower the 
m
ij s , the 
higher will be the optimal tax competition  ) (
* m
ij s n  .  
The policy implication of Proposition 2-T is that the higher the income inequality in a 
region, the higher is the oversupply of public goods from intraregional political competition in 
the region and, therefore, the higher the optimal interregional tax competition that will be 
required to achieve the first-best provision of public goods.    
 
4.3. Optimal intraregional political competition 
Replacing 




ij s s =  that satisfies (17).  From Lemmas 
1-2, this 
* P




ij s s =   via intraregional political 
competition.  Thus, Proposition 1-T can be put differently: 
 
Proposition 1-P (Political competition). Given  1 > n  (interregional tax competition), there 
is an  ) (




ij =  (the optimal intraregional political competition) under which public goods 
will be optimally supplied (
F
i gg = ). 
Corollary 1-T can also be put differently: 19 
 
Corollary 1-P.  Given  1 > n , increased intraregional political competition (a decrease in 
m
ij s ) 
will “correct” the undersupply of public goods caused by interregional tax competition if 
) (




ij >  . 
Using (17), we obtain 
i i
P
ij n Ns ε τ ) 1 ( 1
* − − =  ∀ i.                                                (18)  









Proposition 2-P.  Other things being equal (i.e., N and  i iε τ  are given), the higher the n, the 
lower will be the optimal intraregional political competition  ) (
* n s
m
ij .  
The policy implication of Proposition 2-P is that the higher the interregional tax 
competition facing a region, the higher is the undersupply of public goods in the region and, 
therefore, the higher the income inequality that will be required for intraregional political 
competition to achieve the first-best provision of public goods.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the implications of the interaction between interregional tax 
competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods.  
In contrast to Hoyt’s (1991) finding that the extent to which public goods are undersupplied is 
monotonically increasing in the number of competing regions, we have shown that the 
relationship between the level of public good supply and the number of competing regions is 
non-monotonic if political as well as tax competition is considered.  Interestingly, we have 
found that interregional tax competition alone tends to lead to an undersupply of public goods, 
while intraregional political competition alone tends to lead to an oversupply of public goods; 20 
however, putting both competitions together can result in the optimal provision of public 
goods.  In this sense, considering either competition in isolation is indeed incomplete, if not 
misleading. 
In the presence of political competition, tax competition may have desirable effects and, 
perhaps more interestingly, there may be an optimal intensity of tax competition.  Our result 
suggests that Hoyt’s (1991) emphasized tradeoff between Tiebout sorting and the costs of tax 
competition may not exist once political as well as tax competition is considered. 
Our model is admittedly highly stylized and abstracts from several possible directions of 
generalization, such as asymmetric country size, heterogeneous non-capital income, 
incumbency effects, the role of bureaucrats, and taxes other than the capital income tax.   
Nevertheless, it is hoped that our model may have highlighted the importance of considering 
both tax and political competition in the analysis of public good provision.      21 
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